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Conflicts of Interest and Effective
Representation: The Dilemma of
Corporate Counsel
by
GEORGE D. REYCRAFT*
In April of 1986, the New York law firm of Rogers & Wells agreed
to the largest malpractice settlement ever reported, paying $40 million to
settle 330 lawsuits that charged the firm with aiding and abetting fraud
committed by a client investment company.1 The lawsuits maintained
that Rogers & Wells had failed to notify regulatory authorities and had
continued to represent the investment company after learning of its se-
curities law violations.
In March of 1987, the New York law firm of Fried, Frank, Harris,
Shriver & Jacobson (Fried Frank) and one of its members were named as
defendants in an action brought by limited partners in Ivan F. Boesky's
arbitrage partnership. 2  The limited partners alleged, among other
things, that Fried Frank and its member had (1) participated in the offer
and sale of unregistered securities in violation of sections 53 and 12(1) 4 of
the Securities Act of 1933, (2) assisted in the offer and sale of partnership
securities by means of false and misleading offering materials in violation
of section 12(2)5 of the Securities Act of 1933 and section 10(b) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934,6 and (3) breached their fiduciary duty
to the limited partners. In July of 1987, the court denied Fried Frank's
motions to dismiss.7
In June of 1987, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC)
charged that a partner of Sullivan & Cromwell had failed to advise his
* Partner, Cadwalader, Wickersham & Taft, New York, N.Y. Member New York Bar.
B.A. 1947, Wesleyan University; LL.B. 1950, Harvard University.
1. Galante, After S40M Payment, It's Not Over Yet for Rogers & Wells, Nat'l L.J., Apr.
14, 1986, at 1, col. 1.
2. Arden Way Assocs. v. Boesky, No. 87 Civ. 1865 (S.D.N.Y. filed Mar. 20, 1987).
3. 15 U.S.C. § 77e (1975).
4. Id. § 771(1).
5. Id. § 771(2).
6. Id. §78.
7. Arden Way Assocs. v. Boesky, 664 F. Supp. 855, 858 (S.D.N.Y. 1987).
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client to promptly disclose confidential takeover negotiations in accord-
ance with securities laws.8 The lawyer was a director of a company that
was the target of a hostile takeover. The lawyer also served as corporate
counsel to the target and was allegedly responsible for the decision not to
disclose the target's merger negotiations with a white knight. As of this
writing, these charges are pending.
These cases are but a few examples of a growing number of lawsuits
being brought against lawyers and law firms engaged in the practice of
corporate and securities law. Such lawsuits often involve lawyers who
are alleged to have assisted their clients in the commission of securities
law violations. 9 An ever increasing number of suits, however, arise out
of routine services provided by corporate and securities lawyers, such as
preparing offering materials, issuing opinions, and determining the sub-
stance and timing of disclosures.10 Moreover, suits against lawyers are
more frequently being brought by persons who were not themselves cli-
ents of the lawyers, but who nonetheless claim that the lawyers have
breached a duty owed to them. I
A number of underlying factors appear to explain the growing
number of lawsuits being brought against corporate and securities law-
yers. Section I of this Essay surveys several factors contributing to this
increase. Section II discusses the ethical problems peculiar to the prac-
tice of corporate and securities lawyers.
I. Factors Contributing to the Rise in Lawsuits
Against Lawyers
There are several factors underlying the trend toward naming law-
yers as defendants in lawsuits. One factor is the trend of law firms to
develop into specialty boutiques, handling the complex, sophisticated
corporate work that cannot be handled in-house or by general practice
law firms. As a consequence of this trend, a handful of law firms have
cultivated specialized corporate practices that are eagerly sought out by
increasing numbers of corporations requiring the expertise of these few
8. In re Allied Stores Corp., [current] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 84.142 (June 29,
1987).
9. See, e.g., Freschi v. Grand Coal Venture, 767 F.2d 1041 (2d Cir. 1985). vacated. 106
S. Ct. 3325 (1986); Arden Way, 664 F. Supp at 857; In re American Principals Holding, Inc.
Litig., No. 85-949, MDL 653 (S.D. Cal. filed Oct. 16, 1987); Koehler v. Pulvers, 606 F. Supp.
164 (S.D. Cal.), aff'd, 614 F. Supp. 829, 836 (S.D. Cal. 1985).
10. See, e.g., Lewis v. Schultz, [1985-1986 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
92,363 (E.D. Ark. 1985); Kilmartin v. H.C. Wainwright & Co., 580 F. Supp. 604 (D. Mass.
1984); Reingold v. Deloitte Haskins & Sells, 559 F. Supp. 1241 (S.D.N.Y. 1984).
11. Labaton, Parties Who Are Not Clients, N.Y. Times, Sept. 7, 1987, at 26, col. 1.
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select firms. This is particularly true in the mergers and acquisitions
practice. The end result is that the specialty firm inevitably faces fre-
quent and recurring conflicts of interest between present and former cli-
ents with adverse or potentially adverse interests. 12 These conflicts often
result in lawsuits to disqualify the law firm13 and, in some instances, in
actions for malpractice.14
A second factor that has encouraged lawsuits against lawyers is the
change in the way the public and the courts perceive lawyers and law
firms. 15 In the past, the practice of law was considered a "profession"
and held favored status. Today, law firms are perceived to be more like
businesses. As a result, the courts are beginning to treat law firms like
other businesses and eliminating the aura of protection and trust that
enveloped law firms in the past.16
Increased and often fierce competition among top law firms that
continue to offer a broad range of legal services also contributes to the
rise in the number of lawsuits brought against attorneys. This competi-
tion has only increased the importance of the large corporate clients to
law firms that depend on corporate clients as their main source of reve-
nues. This climate, not surprisingly, develops in attorneys an eagerness to
please clients or potential clients, as well as a struggle by law firms to
differentiate and distinguish themselves. 17
A fourth factor that cannot be overlooked is that the lawyer or law
firm usually maintains a sizable malpractice insurance policy. Thus law-
yers, like accountants and underwriters, are often seen as "deep pockets"
and a ready source of settlement or award money.18
The final and foremost factor underlying the trend toward naming
lawyers as defendants in lawsuits appears to be the failure of the profes-
12. See, e.g., Eckerd v. Dart Group Corp., 621 F. Supp. 725 (D. Del. 1985) (disqualifying
counsel for target of hostile takeover in situation in which counsel had previously represented
acquiror in attempted takeover of different company).
13. See id.
14. The Maryland Deposit Ins. Fund Corp. v. Venable, Baetjer & Howard, No. 1112919
(Circuit Ct. Anne Arundle County July 3, 1986); see also Victor, Venable Agrees to S27M
Accord, Nat'l L.J., May 25, 1987, at 3, col. I (discussing lawsuits against the Baltimore law
firm Venable, Baetjer & Howard, which was charged with fraud, deceit, malpractice, and
breach of fiduciary duty arising out of the firm's alleged impropriety in representing conflicting
interests).
15. Gillers, Ethics That Bite: Lawyers'Liability to Third Parties, 13 LITIGATION 8 (Win-
ter 1987).
16. Id. at 12.
17. See Marcus, Risk of Ethics Litigation Raises Ante for Blue-Chip Law Firms, Wash.
Post, May 26, 1987, Metro, at Bl, col. 2.
18. See Gray, Under Fire: Regulators, the Courts and Clients Bear Down on Lawyers,
Wall St. J., Aug. 21, 1987, at 17, col. 3.
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sional responsibility guidelines to address the problems of modem corpo-
rate law practice. The Model Code of Professional Responsibility
(Model Code) speaks, for the most part, to trial lawyers, providing guide-
lines for the ethical dilemmas faced in a litigation context. 19 The Model
Code fails to provide detailed guidelines for lawyers engaging in the prac-
tice of corporate or securities law.20 How such lawyers should perceive
their role and responsibilities in providing corporate counseling is a ques-
tion on which the Model Code is remarkably silent. Recent case law
indicates that Model Code guidelines, which apply more appropriately in
the litigation context, are wholly inadequate when applied to the corpo-
rate counsel's practice. 2 1 The Model Rules of Professional Conduct
(Model Rules), while shedding a glimmer of light on certain questions,22
similarly fail to address the role of corporate and securities counsel.
II. Representing an Organizational Client
A. The Problem: Inherent Conflicts of Interest
In representing the organizational client, the corporate lawyer must
often grapple with conflicting duties of loyalty, confidentiality, and zeal
owed to the various "constituents" or interest groups that make up the
organizational client.23 In the case of a corporation, these "constituents"
may consist of a board of directors, management, and shareholders. A
limited partnership, on the other hand, consists of a general partner and
one or more limited partners.
With respect to the representation of an organizational client, the
Model Code provides:
A lawyer employed or retained by a corporation or similar entity owes
his allegiance to the entity and not to a stockholder, director, officer,
employee, representative or other person connected with the entity. In
advising the entity, a lawyer should keep paramount its interest and his
professional judgment should not be influenced by the personal desires
of any person or organization. 24
Similarly, Model Rule 1.13(a) provides that the lawyer for an organiza-
tion "represents the organization acting through its duly authorized
19. See, e.g., MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 5-15. DR 5-102. 5-
106, 7-101 to 7-110 (1980).
20. Burke, The Duty of Confidentiality and Disclosing Corporate Misconduct. 36 Bus.
LAW. 239, 279 (1981).
21. See infra notes 48-61 and accompanying text.
22. See notes 36-47 and accompanying text.
23. Note, Conflicts of Interest in the Legal Profession, 94 HARV. L. REV. 1244. 1344
(1984).
24. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 5-18 (1980).
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constituents." 25
Problems for the corporate and securities lawyer arise because at
various times, including securities offerings and corporate acquisitions,
the interests of the organizational client's constituents diverge. The cor-
porate counsel is then placed in the position of determining who com-
mands his primary loyalty and how he can adequately fulfill his duties
and responsibilities to each constituent in the face of their conflicting
interests. Because the Model Code and Model Rules fail to explain how
a corporate lawyer can determine the "entity's" interest in such situa-
tions, the lawyer must confront competing loyalties and duties of confi-
dences to the various groups with little or no guidance as to how he
might resolve the conflicts. The failure of professional guidelines to de-
lineate how the corporate lawyer should respond has made corporate at-
torneys vulnerable to suits by disgruntled constituents.
B. Situations in Which Constituent Interests Diverge
Conflicts of interest among constituents of the corporate client fre-
quently arise in the following situations: (1) derivative suits and direct
actions against the entity; (2) cases of fraud and self-dealing by manage-
ment;26 and (3) battles for corporate control.27 This section will focus on
fraud and self-dealing.
Management fraud or self-dealing may occur in the securities offer-
ings context and often involves the failure to make appropriate disclosure
to investors, the public, or the SEC.28 When self-dealing or fraud is com-
mitted by management, the interests of management directly conflict
with the interests of the shareholders, limited partners, or other investors
in the entity. The corporate lawyer who is advised of the fraud or self-
dealing or learns of it as a consequence of his own investigation thus
confronts a situation in which the entity's constituent groups have
sharply conflicting interests. The lawyer must determine what is in the
entity's best interest and how it can be achieved. In responding to this
situation, the lawyer must proceed with extreme caution.
Even if the lawyer does not obtain actual knowledge of the fraud or
self-dealing, he may nevertheless be held liable as an aider and abettor if
the wrongdoing was so obvious that he should have been aware of it29 or
25. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.13(a) (1983).
26. Note, supra note 23, at 1337-45.
27. See generally Steinberg, Attorney Conflicts of Interest in Corporate Acquisitions, 39
HASTINGS L.J. 579 (1988).
28. See infra notes 48-61 and accompanying text.
29. See SEC v. Frank, 388 F.2d 486, 489 (2d Cir. 1968).
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if he recklessly disregarded the wrongdoing. 30 The lawyer may also have
a duty to investigate a client before assisting in a securities offering. 3' In
such cases, the lawyer's failure to discover fraud or self-dealing has been
held to be actionable if a reasonable investigation would have uncovered
the fraud. 32
Moreover, the defense that the lawyer did not know of the fraud or
self-dealing may be ineffective in disposing of these cases in the early
stages because the lawyer's lack of knowledge may be difficult to prove
on a motion to dismiss or a motion for summary judgment.33 This will
be especially true if the lawyer's relationship with the client was long-
standing or closely knit, for example, if the lawyer sat on the client's
board of directors 34 or held even a nominal position in management.
35
If the corporate or securities lawyer learns of an ongoing fraud or
self-dealing by management, he frequently finds that it is difficult to de-
termine an appropriate method of response. On the one hand, the lawyer
owes a duty to protect the entity and thus presumably its beneficial own-
ers. On the other hand, the lawyer may also owe a corresponding duty to
the managers who committed the fraud or self-dealing.
C. Ethical Guidelines
The Model Code is not particularly enlightening on the issue of how
a corporate or securities lawyer should respond upon discovering that his
organizational client's management has committed securities fraud. The
Model Code provides that a lawyer who discovers that his client has en-
gaged in fraud shall promptly ask the client to "rectify" the fraud. 36 The
lawyer may not reveal the fraud to third parties if the information has
been obtained in the context of a privileged attorney-client communica-
tion.37 The revelation of management misconduct may also be prohib-
ited by Canon 4 of the Model Code, which requires a lawyer to preserve
the secrets and confidences of a client.
30. Rolf v. Blyth, Eastman Dillon & Co., 570 F.2d 38, 44 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S.
1039 (1978).
31. Felts v. National Account Sys. Ass'n, 469 F. Supp. 54, 67 (N.D. Miss. 1978) (citing
Escott v. Barchris Constr. Corp., 283 F. Supp. 643 (S.D.N.Y. 1968)).
32. Id. at 67-68.
33. See, e.g., Kilmartin v. H.C. Wainwright & Co., 580 F. Supp. 604, 608 (D. Mass.
1984) (holding that "[k]nowledge [of fraud] may be averred generally" and denying attorney's
motion to dismiss claims for aiding and abetting securities fraud).
34. Escott v. Barchris Constr. Corp., 283 F. Supp. 643, 691 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
35. See Feit v. Leasco Data Processing Equip. Corp., 32 F. Supp. 544, 575-76 (E.D.N.Y.
1971).
36. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 7-102(B)(1) (1980).
37. Id. DR 4-101.
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Where the client is an "entity" and fraud is committed by its man-
agement, the Model Code leaves unclear whether the corporate lawyer
may reveal the fraud to the entity's beneficial owners (i.e., shareholders
or limited partners) so that they may protect their interests. 38 Some au-
thorities have maintained that the lawyer may reveal the fraud to the
entity's owners. For example, the New York City Bar, has opined such
disclosure would not violate Canon 4, at least when the lawyer for an
entity owes his duty of loyalty to the entity and not to the defrauding
manager.39
The Model Code gives the lawyer two possible courses of conduct if
his client refuses to rectify the fraud. Ethical Consideration 7-5 provides
that a lawyer may continue to represent a client even when that client
pursues a course of conduct contrary to the lawyer's advice as long as the
lawyer does not "thereby knowingly assist the client" in illegal con-
duct.4° Ethical Consideration 7-5, further provides, however, that a law-
yer should never encourage or aid his client in committing criminal acts
or counsel his client on how to violate the law or to avoid punishment for
its violation. Thus, the Model Code permits a lawyer to withdraw from
representing the client if "the client personally seeks to pursue an illegal
course of conduct" or "insists that the lawyer pursue a course of conduct
that is illegal or that is prohibited by the Disciplinary Rules."'41
Although the Model Code gives the lawyer little guidance in elect-
ing the proper course to take, as an overall policy the Model Code seems
to discourage withdrawal. 42 This policy appears to be aimed at protect-
ing the client's right to counsel of his choice and the client's interest in
retaining continuity of representation in the litigation context.43 Thus,
any policy against withdrawal should not be interpreted to apply with
equal force to the corporate context, especially when management en-
gages in fraud. In the corporate setting, any client "right" to counsel of
his choice is less compelling. Moreover, where the client continues to
engage in fraud or refuses to rectify his wrongdoing despite his lawyer's
advice, the lawyer runs the risk of appearing to assist the client in the
fraud. Particularly in the current legal environment, where this risk can
38. Id. DR 7-102(B).
39. N.Y. City Bar Formal Op. 1986-2 (Apr. 30, 1986); see also SEC v. National Student
Marketing Corp., [1971-1972 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) % 93,360 (D.D.C.
1972).
40. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 7-5 (1980).
41. Id. DR 2-110.
42. See, e.g., id. EC 2-32 ("a decision by a lawyer to withdraw should be made only on
the basis of compelling circumstances").
43. See id. DR 2-110 (dealing with representation of a client before a tribunal).
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result in civil liability for the lawyer, the lawyer should be free to with-
draw from such employment without violating his ethical obligations.
The Model Rules attempt to provide more explicit direction to a
corporate lawyer who encounters fraud by management. Model Rule
1.13(b) provides that a lawyer who discovers fraud that is "likely to re-
sult in substantial injury to the organization ... shall proceed as is rea-
sonably necessary in the best interest of the organization."' 44 The
measures taken by the lawyer must be "designed to minimize disruption
to the organization and the risk of revealing information relating to the
representation to persons outside the organization. '4 5 The rule suggests
various measures that may be taken when a lawyer discovers fraud: (1)
asking management to reconsider the matter; (2) advising management
to obtain a separate legal opinion; (3) referring the matter to a higher
authority in the organization; and (4) resigning if the lawyer's other ef-
forts to dissuade clearly illegal conduct are unsuccessful. 4 6
A version of the Model Rules provision was adopted by the SEC as
the appropriate response for a securities lawyer who discovers that his
client is failing to make appropriate disclosures. In In re Carter & John-
son,47 the SEC held that when a lawyer becomes aware that his client is
engaged in a substantial and continuing failure to satisfy disclosure re-
quirements, his continued representation violates professional standards
unless he takes prompt steps to end the client's noncompliance. The law-
yer should first advise the client to make proper disclosure. If the law-
yer's advice is not followed, however, the lawyer must take affirmative
steps to avoid being "co-opted" into the ongoing fraud. Such steps
should first include a direct approach to the board of directors or to
members of management not involved in the fraud. If all else fails, the
lawyer may resign.
D. Recent Decisions Involving Claims Against Corporate
and Securities Lawyers
Despite the existence of these rules, recent lawsuits have evidenced
an increase in the number of claims brought against lawyers who alleg-
edly failed to take appropriate action when an organizational client was
engaged in an on-going fraud or securities law violation.
A large number of these cases involve investors who claim that they
44. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.13(b) (1983).
45. Id.
46. Id. Rule 1.13(b), (c).
47. Exchange Release No. 17,597 [1981 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
82,847 (Feb. 28, 1981).
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relied on false or misleading offering materials. 48 Such investors claim
that the lawyer for the issuer assisted in the offer and sale of securities by
means of offering materials that the lawyer knew contained material mis-
statements or omissions. Investors have argued that lawyers were instru-
mental in the sale of securities by (1) soliciting investors,49 (2) making
misrepresentations regarding the investment,50 or (3) structuring the of-
fering to avoid disclosure requirements.5 1 Other investors have alleged
that the lawyer assisted in the fraud merely by rendering routine legal
services, including preparation of offering materials and issuance of legal
opinions.52 Those allegations, coupled with the pleading of scienter, have
been held sufficient to state a claim against lawyers. 53
Lawyers have also been charged with having acted improperly by
continuing to represent their organizational clients after learning of man-
agement's continuing fraud.54 According to these cases, upon discover-
ing the fraud the lawyer should have resigned from representing the
entity. Instead, the lawyer continued to represent the entity and lent "an
appearance of legitimacy" to the illegal securities offering for which lia-
bility is sought to be imposed.55
The beneficial owners of an organizational client have claimed that
the lawyer owes them a duty that is breached by the lawyer's failure to
advise them of management's fraud.5 6 Support for this argument is
found in authorities holding that the lawyer represents the interest of the
beneficial owners, at least when management is perpetrating a fraud on
the entity.5 7 In cases involving start-up corporations that fail, investors
48. See, e.g., Junker v. Crory, 650 F.2d 1349 (5th Cir. 1981); Arden Way Assocs. v.
Boesky, 664 F. Supp. 855, 856 (S.D.N.Y. 1987); Block v. First Blood Assocs., 663 F. Supp. 50
(S.D.N.Y. 1987); Kilmartin v. H.C. Wainwright & Co., 580 F. Supp. 604 (D. Mass. 1984);
Hagert v. Glickman, Lurie, Eiger & Co., 520 F. Supp. 1028 (D. Minn. 1981).
49. Plaintiffs' Amended Complaint at 137-40, Arden Way Assocs. v. Boesky, 664 F.
Supp. 855 (S.D.N.Y. 1987).
50. Id.; Junker, 650 F.2d at 1356; Excaliber Oil, Inc. v. Sullivan, 616 F. Supp. 458, 465
(D.C. Ill. 1985).
51. Plaintiffs' Amended Complaint at 137-40, Arden Way Assocs. v. Boesky, 664 F.
Supp. 855 (S.D.N.Y. 1987); Koehler v. Pulvers, 606 F. Supp. 164, 169 (S.D. Cal. 1985).
52. See, e.g., Block, 663 F. Supp. at 51; Seidel v. Public Serv. Co., 616 F. Supp. 1342,
1361 (D.N.H. 1985); Kilmartin, 580 F. Supp. at 608.
53. Reingold v. Deloitte, Haskins & Sells, 599 F. Supp. 1241, 1267-68 (S.D.N.Y. 1984);
Kilmartin, 580 F. Supp. at 608.
54. See, e.g., In re American Principals Holding, Inc. Litig., No. 85-949, MDL 653 (S.D.
Cal. filed Oct. 16, 1987).
55. Id.
56. Plaintiffs' Amended Complaint at 137-40, Arden Way Assocs. v. Boesky, 664 F.
Supp. 855 (S.D.N.Y. 1987).
57. See, eg., Skloff v. Bickley, No. 85-5555, slip op. (E.D. Pa. Dec. 31, 1986); N.Y. City
Bar Formal Op. 1986-2 (Apr. 30, 1986); Texas Bar Op. 387 (1977); cf Garner v. Wolfinbarger,
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can rely on cases holding that corporate counsel may owe a duty to them
when they are the intended beneficiaries of the lawyer's actions. 58
The mergers and takeovers context is conducive to claims against
lawyers for involvement in the organizational client's securities viola-
tions. To preserve their own positions, the incumbent management or
board of directors may be reluctant to make certain disclosures. A law-
yer's failure to advise in favor of required disclosures to the SEC may
lead to securities violation claims against him.59 A material misrepresen-
tation or omission to shareholders by management in defending against a
hostile tender offer may also result in a securities violation claim against
a lawyer. 60  Finally, a lawyer's failure to disclose to shareholders his
potential self-interest in a merger could also result in a securities
violation. 6
1
Conclusion
The recent onslaught of lawsuits against corporate and securities
lawyers signals a warning to lawyers to be increasingly vigilant in their
representation of organizational clients. The ethical problems faced by
corporate and securities lawyers now present the additional risk that
such problems may result in steep liability. Recent decisions make clear
that lawyers are more vulnerable to lawsuits when they step out of their
professional role and take a more active part in their client's business by
promoting deals, soliciting investors, conducting meetings at the firm's
premises, and becoming tied to client companies as directors or general
partners. Such conduct makes lawyers appear less like advisors and
more like principals, who may be charged with participating in and fur-
430 F.2d 1093, 1103-04 (5th Cir. 1970) (availability of attorney-client privilege for corporate
client in a suit against stockholders is subject to the right of stockholders to show cause why it
should not be invoked, as required for protection of stockholders interests), cert. denied, 401
U.S. 974 (1974).
58. Hi Stickney, Inc. v. Dahal & Appel, No. 81 Civ. 4732 (S.D.N.Y. May 21, 1982)
(LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist. file); Morgan v. Prudential Group, Inc., 527 F. Supp. 957, 961
(S.D.N.Y. 1981), aff'd, 729 F.2d 1443 (2d Cir. 1983).
59. See In re Allied Stores Corp., [1987 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
1 84,142 (June 29, 1987) (lawyer who served as a director and outside counsel violated securi-
ties laws by failing to advise organizational client to properly disclose to the SEC actions
undertaken by existing management to defend against a hostile tender offer).
60. See SEC v. National Student Marketing Corp., 457 F. Supp. 682, 711-12 (D.D.C.
1978) (lawyers' conscious decision to close a merger agreement before management disclosed
to shareholders new financial statements that indicated a significant adjustment violated anti-
fraud provisions of the securities).
61. See Kas v. Financial Gen. Bankshares, 796 F.2d 508, 513-15 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (court
recognized a duty to disclose, in proxy materials for cash-out merger, a lawyer's conflicting
roles as both counsel and director of the corporation).
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thering the client's wrongful conduct. Yet there are no clear-cut guide-
lines for resolving many of the complex ethical dilemmas that arise for
corporate counsel. The corporate and securities bar should initiate revi-
sions to the Model Code and Model Rules to guide counsel through the
minefield of conflicts in corporate representation.

